In re Hemphill

Case No. 390-36757-H13 USDC Civ. No. 91-902-Fr 9-30-91 Affirming Bankruptcy Court (HLH)

The US District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's oral ruling that a judgment creditor was not entitled to relief from the co-debtor stay or from the automatic stay. The District Court stated that the creditor's failure to object to the provisions of the chapter 13 plan bound the creditor and rendered the appeal moot.

Even if the creditor were not so bound, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling on the minimal record produced at the hearing that the co-debtor stay was applicable since the debt was for a consumer transaction.

Finally, the District Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the creditor was not entitled to relief from the automatic stay because the plan proposed to pay all creditors in full. There was no evidence that the creditor lacked adequate protection or even that the creditor was held a perfected security interest in any property.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

In re)
OLIVER HEMPHILL,) Case No. 390-36757-Hl3
) Civil No. 91-902-FR
Debtor.	j
) ORDER

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FRYE, Judge:

The matter before the court is the appeal of David H. Regan, M.D. from an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court denying his motion for relief from stay.

BACKGROUND

The debtor in this bankruptcy proceeding is Oliver PAGE 1 - OPINION

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Hemphill. Hemphill is the sole shareholder of Taralara Holdings, Ltd. (Taralara).

On or about June 19, 1986, the appellant in this appeal, Dr. Regan, entered into a Lease Purchase Agreement to lease, and eventually to sell, a ranch to Taralara. The ranch consists of twenty acres of land. Taralara agreed to pay Dr. Regan over \$49,000 for the option to purchase the ranch under the Lease Purchase Agreement. The selling price of the ranch was \$549,000.

On or about February 28, 1987, Dr. Regan and Taralara entered into a contract for the sale of the personal property associated with the ranch, in which Taralara agreed to pay to Dr. Regan \$27,800.

In May of 1987, Taralara was involuntarily dissolved. The payments required to be made to Dr. Regan by Taralara under the Lease Purchase Agreement and the contract for the sale of the personal property were not made.

On November 20, 1989, Dr. Regan filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11.

On September 10, 1990, Dr. Regan obtained a judgment from the United States Bankruptcy Court against Taralara, Oliver Hemphill and Evelyn Hemphill, the former wife of Oliver Hemphill, on the contract for the sale of personal property associated with the ranch and the fair rental value of the ranch. The judgment provides, in part, as follows:

1. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants on his First Claim for Relief as follows:

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Defendants, and each of them, are ordered to immediately turn over to the Debtor in possession [Dr. Regan] all of the personal property which is the subject of Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief; In the event that the Defendants, or any of them, desire to purchase all of the personal property which is the subject of Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief, Defendants, and each of them, are ordered to pay Plaintiff \$27,500, plus statutory post judgment interest, from April 30, 1987 until paid.

5. With respect to Plaintiff's Fifth Claim for Relief, awarding Plaintiff judgment against Defendants in the amount of \$38,500 (representing the reasonable value of the use of the real property which is the subject of Plaintiff's Fifth Claim for Relief from July 1, 1989 until Plaintiff's interest in the said property was foreclosed), together with prejudgment interest at the rate of nine percent (9%), per annum, in the amount of \$2,876.11, with postjudgment interest accruing at the statutory rate.

The judgment was docketed in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Clackamas on October 5, 1990 and now represents a debt owing to Dr. Regan of over \$90,000, with accrued statutory interest.

On December 13, 1990, Hemphill filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 13.

On February 21, 1991, Dr. Regan filed a notice of motion for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c) to permit him to pursue his rights to the ranch. In his motion for relief from the automatic stay, Dr. Regan contended that Hemphill had listed in his Chapter 13 statement the sum of \$40,000 as the amount of the debt owed to Dr. Regan. Dr. Regan further asserted that the Clackamas County PAGE 3 - OPINION

Circuit Court judgment of September 10, 1990 requires Hemphill to pay \$27,500 or to return the personal property and the sum of \$38,500, plus interest. Because this sum represents considerably more than the \$40,000 indebtedness listed by Hemphill, Dr. Regan argued that he is entitled to relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c).

On March 19, 1991, the bankruptcy court held a hearing to address Dr. Regan's motion to lift the automatic stay. Hemphill argued against the motion to lift the automatic stay because he is purchasing the equipment represented by the \$27,500 judgment under the plan as allowed by the judgment of September 10, 1990. Hemphill argued that the interest of Dr. Regan in the judgment is protected by the bankruptcy plan, and no action on the property can be taken against him or his co-debtor, Evelyn Hemphill.

Dr. Regan argued at the hearing to address his motion to lift the automatic stay that the judgment of September 10, 1990 required Hemphill to turn over or to pay for the property at issue immediately. Since Hemphill did not turn over the property or pay Dr. Regan, Dr. Regan argued that the automatic stay should be lifted so that he could immediately execute on the property.

The bankruptcy court concluded that the judgment of September 10, 1990 allowed Hemphill to exercise the right to pay money for the personal property, and that adequate provision for payment had been made in the Chapter 13 plan. As a

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result, the bankruptcy court concluded that Hemphill is purchasing the equipment under the plan as allowed by the judgment, and the interest of Dr. Regan is adequately protected. The bankruptcy court allowed Dr. Regan no relief from the stay. As to the \$38,500 judgment on the fifth claim for relief for the reasonable value for the use of the property, the bankruptcy court found that the Chapter 13 plan contemplates full payment of the debt to Dr. Regan which would be fixed by the proof of claim that was actually filed. The bankruptcy court concluded that there were no grounds upon which relief from the automatic stay would be granted.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Dr. Regan contends that 1) the bankruptcy court erred in denying his motion to lift the automatic stay under section 1301 because the debt was a business debt, rather than a consumer debt, and therefore Dr. Regan was entitled to pursue the obligation against the co-debtor, Evelyn Hemphill;

2) the bankruptcy court erred in denying his motion to lift the automatic stay under section 362(d)(1) because he was in the position of a secured creditor without adequate protection under the bankruptcy plan; and 3) the bankruptcy court erred in denying his motion to lift the automatic stay under section 362(d)(2) because Hemphill had no equity in the property, and ///

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the property was not necessary for an effective reorganization.

Hemphill contends that 1) the bankruptcy court properly concluded that the personal property at issue was for personal, family or household use, so that the statutory provisions for maintenance of the section 1301 co-debtor stay were satisfied; 2) Dr. Regan is not entitled to adequate protection because he is not a secured creditor; and 3) it was proper for the bankruptcy court to conclude that personal property used to maintain the residence of Hemphill and the animals located on the property is necessary for an effective reorganization. In any event, Hemphill asserts that the Chapter 13 plan has been confirmed, and that Dr. Regan has not objected to that confirmation nor raised the issue of confirmation on appeal, thereby rendering this appeal moot.

APPLICABLE LAW

In reviewing a decision of a bankruptcy court, a district court acts as an appellate tribunal and is governed by traditional standards of appellate review. Factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erronoeus standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Ragsdale v. Haller, 780 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1986).

¹ In his motion for relief from automatic stay, Dr. Regan relies only upon section 1301(c) as a grounds for relief, but does ask the court to grant such other relief as is just.

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11 U.S.C. § 1327 states the effect of confirmation as follows:

- (a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.
- (b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.
- (c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.

The confirmed Chapter 13 plan of Hemphill provides for 100% payment to Dr. Regan as an unsecured creditor in paragraph 2(d) and makes no other provisions regarding the property of the estate. Dr. Regan did not object to the plan and does not appeal the confirmation of the plan. Hemphill convincingly argues that, pursuant to section 1327, the confirmed plan binds Dr. Regan, and therefore Dr. Regan has no right to relief from the stay at this stage in the proceedings, rendering this appeal moot.

Even if this appeal were not to be considered moot, this court concludes that the bankruptcy court properly denied Dr. Regan's motion for relief from the stay based upon the record before the court for the following reasons:

1. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 provides that the stay of an action

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against a co-debtor does not apply if the debt is a business or non-consumer debt. Dr. Regan asserted at the bankruptcy hearing that he should be allowed to pursue legal remedies against the co-debtor, Evelyn Hemphill, under section 1301 on the grounds that the obligation was not a consumer debt. There was little or no evidence presented at the hearing as to this issue. Counsel for Hemphill respresented to the bankruptcy court that the ranch was a "hobby farm." Counsel for Dr. Regan represented to the bankruptcy court that it was not a "hobby farm" because Hemphill files a schedule F with the Internal Revenue Service.

Despite this dispute, it is undisputed that Hemphill resides at the residence, and the bankruptcy court could properly conclude from the slim record before it that the obligation was a consumer debt and that relief from the stay was not proper under section 1301.

2. Dr. Regan asserts a right to relief from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) on the grounds that he has a secured claim on the portion of the judgment based on the contract for sale of personal property, and he is without adequate protection as to that secured claim.

There is no evidence in this record that the contract for sale of personal property created a security interest in the personal property. Furthermore, there is no evidence in this record that the Chapter 13 plan providing for 100% payment is not an adequate form of protection in this case.

3. Finally, Dr. Regan contends that he is entitled to relief from the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) because he has proven (a) his debt; (b) the perfection of his security interest; and (c) the value of the collateral. The bankruptcy court concluded that Dr. Regan did not prove to it that he had a security interest in the personal property. This court finds that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2) was not proper.

CONCLUSION

The appeal from the order of the bankruptcy court denying Dr. Regan's motion for relief from the stay in the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed.

DATED this 30 day of September, 1991.

HELZŃ J. FRYE

United States District Judge